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recourse to the tools of the probability calculus. In so doing it suggests that it may be necessary to include in our analysis certain considerations which have been largely absent from the discussions in the literature if our understanding of the problem of social choice is to advance beyond its present state.
In certain respects, the works of Plott [8] , Tullock [12] , and Simpson [11] are more closely related to the research reported here than the other literature cited. Similar to each of these papers, this approach represents the alternatives available to society by defining them in terms of points in n-dimensional space. Given this conception and a well defined preference function for each individual, a special kind of majority rule (probably best called non-minority rule) is specified, and Arrow's famous paradox is illustrated in terms of a simple example. Necessary and sufficient conditions are defined for the existence of a unique alternative that will receive a majority against any other alternative. These conditions for the dominance of a single alternative are closely related to the results of Plott [8] who, using a different formulation which allows only a finite number of individuals to be considered, also explores the problem of determining when a unique alternative can be certain to command a majority. Tullock [12] also is concerned solely with dominance, but his two-dimensional structure bears a close resemblance to the n-dimensional one used here. In particular, the utility functions implicit in Tullock's analysis, which is informally developed without theorems or proofs by the device of insightful examples, belong to the same general class as the ones utilized herein. Simpson [11] combines the approaches of Plott and Tullock to obtain conditions for the dominance of a unique alternative when the number of individuals is finite.
In addition to the issue of dominance, there is also the problem of finding conditions under which an unambiguous social preference ordering can be defined. While the above do not consider this problem, necessary and sufficient conditions are developed herein for majority rule to define a transitive social preference ordering for the stated class of utility functions.
THE STRUCTURE
Suppose there exists a set of n cardinal dimensions of choice such that every alternative can be uniquely mapped into the Euclidean n-space which has these dimensions as the axes of the coordinate system. We assume that all points x E En (viewed as column vectors x' = (x1,. . ., xn)) are possible alternatives and that all individuals perceive the alternatives in a common manner. For example, educational policy can be measured by the expenditure per pupil, the teacher-pupil ratio, the amount of audio-visual aids used per pupil, etc. We must assume that each individual in the society perceives the same set of dimensions of choice and locates the alternatives in the Euclidean space similarly. These assumptions do not imply that all individuals have the same preference orderings defined over the space.
The preference ordering over En for any individual is determined by the utility function of the individual. It is convenient to assume that each individual has a most preferred position x E En so that his utility function is maximized by x. While for basically economic dimensions this assumption might appear to be contrary to the usual presumption that individuals have insatiable wants, it is analytically convenient. Further, if one desires to use the concept of loss functions, then one can follow the procedures outlined in Barr and Davis [2] so that by beginning with traditional utility functions and budget constraints a reflection of the utility functions defined below is easily obtained. We also assume that there exists a positive definite matrix A such that given an individual i whose preferred position is x, his utility for any other position y E En is ui(ll y Although the individuals have the same set of orthogonal choice dimensions, they will not in general have the same most preferred point. As a model of the differences in tastes within the population, let P* denote the distribution of most preferred points of the individuals. Let X be the most preferred point of an individual chosen at random from the population. Given a (Borel) set S c En, Pr(S) will denote the probability that X E S under the distribution P*. The relation R is reflexive since yRy. Moreover, for points y E En and z E En, exactly one of the following relations holds: yPz, zPy, or yIz. It is important to note, however, that the special place of indifference in the definition of the relation R means that it does not completely correspond to the traditional definition of majority rule, at least in certain exceptional circumstances, so that it probably could be more appropriately termed nonminority rule.2 Nevertheless, since the circumstances for non-correspondence with the traditional conception are clearly exceptional, the usual terminology is used here.
If n = 1, it can be shown that the relation R is transitive. However, if n > 2 the relation R is not necessarily transitive, although the functions ui are unimodal and well behaved, so that the resulting social preference ordering is not necessarily transitive. We shall demonstrate this fact by a simple geometric argument.
First let us present a geometric interpretation of the rule of social preference given by the inequality (1). Let the points y, z E En be fixed. For any point x E En, some simple algebra shows that Given this geometric interpretation, let us consider a two-dimensional example to demonstrate that, in general, transitivity does not exist for a multidimensional space En even when all utility functions are unimodal. Consider Figure 1 where the horizontal and vertical axes measure the two relevant issues. Assume that the population consists of three individuals and that their most preferred positions 2 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out this fact and for supplying the following example, which is quoted with only a little paraphrasing. Consider a case where fifty-one people are indifferent between y and z and forty-nine people strictly prefer z to y. Under majority rule z will, of course, defeat y, but in this definition we shall have yIz, because we have yRz since more than half the population is indifferent between y and z. Thus the social choice rule studied is not really the traditional majority rule, but something like non-minority rule, closely related to Rmaj as defined by Dummet and Farquharson [5] . The interpretation of Lemma 1 is that a point y* is dominant if and only if, for any hyperplane on which y* does not lie, the probability of the closed y*-side of the hyperplane is at least 2. The next theorem states that y* is dominant if and only if, for any hyperplane containing y*, the probability of the set of points lying either on the hyperplane or on one side of it is at least 2, and this property is true for both sides of every such hyperplane. It should be noted that instead of (6) in Theorem 1, we could just as well have required that for every point a e En, In particular, if the distribution P* can be represented by either a probability density function f or a discrete frequency function f on En, then P* is symmetric about y if f(x) = f(2y -x) for all x E En with the possible exception of a set of probability zero.
THEOREM 2: If P* is symmetric about y*, then y* is dominant.
PROOF: Since P* is symmetric about y*, it follows from (8) and (9) It should be pointed out that symmetry of this type is a sufficient condition for the existence of a dominant point, but it is not necessary. We have already seen (Corollary 1) that the median of any unidimensional distribution is dominant. In any number of dimensions, if a single point carries probability p 1 2, it is dominant regardless of how the remaining probability is distributed.
TRANSITIVITY AND DOMINANCE
At the beginning of the previous section it was pointed out that the existence of a dominant point was not sufficient for the social preference ordering to be transitive. Nevertheless, there is a relationship between dominance and the transitivity of the relation R, and this section is devoted to the exploration ol this relationship. One is tempted to think, at least at first glance, that the assumption that there exists a dominant point and the consequences of Theorem 3 are sufficient to guarantee that the relation R is transitive. Unfortunately, these are not quite sufficient, as the following example demonstrates. Imagine a two-dimensional space and consider the three alternatives w, y, and z which are shown in Figure 2 . Suppose that the probability distributed P* assigns probability 2 to the point w, assigns probability 4 to the small region A distributed with a uniform density over the region, and assigns probability zero to the rest of the space. Then w is dominant in this example. Furthermore, yRz and zRw (in fact, yIz and zIw), but wPy. Hence, the relation is not transitive.
In order to obtain the transitivity of R, we now introduce a further condition on P*. COROLLARY 4: Suppose that the distribution P* is symmetric about a point y* E En and suppose that P* can be represented by a density function in En that is positive throughout some sphere centered at the point y*. Then y* is dominant and the relation R is transitive and completely orders all the points in En.
The next theorem is a strong converse to Corollary 2 and establishes that whenever the relation R is transitive, then there must exist a dominant point. Since the relation R is transitive, we may conclude from this sequence of relations that mRy. Since y was an arbitrary point in En it follows that m is a dominant point.
The preceding results establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for a transitive social preference ordering to be constructed from given individual orderings via the device of majority rule.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
It should be obvious, of course, that this paper does not settle all of the issues raised by the appearance of Arrow's famous impossibility theorem. Even though the theorems that are stated and proved herein establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a transitive social preference ordering, the entire structure does rest upon the particular class of utility functions that were assumed. Although the authors find this class reasonable, and a suitable abstraction, the assumption does have somewhat less "generality" than is sometimes found in discussions of this kind.
If progress is to be made in our understanding of the problem of social choice, and if Arrow's impossibility theorem is not to be an impediment to further work on the topic, then we must continue to attempt to determine when such orderings can and cannot be constructed. We believe that the present work strongly suggests that considerations largely absent in the literature, such as the distribution of the preferences of the electorate, must be brought into the discussions if generalizations beyond the present one are to be established.
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